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I. INTRODUCTION
The system currently in place in the United States for granting and
protecting patents has been around for many years. For most of that time, it
has served its purpose well and operated in a fairly effective and efficient
manner. In recent years, however, developments in science and technology
have produced a new generation of advances that are increasingly complex.
Correspondingly, the legal system has had difficulty adapting to the new
technology.
The difficulty in adaptation to recent scientific advances has been
particularly prominent in patent litigation actions. It has been noted that
judges and juries may be susceptible to rendering under-informed decisions
in these cases. Furthermore, the new ideas and inventions embodied in
patents often must be quickly placed into the marketplace, or the technology
embedded in the patent risks obsolescence. Therefore, it is of paramount
importance that patent disputes be resolved promptly to avoid such a result.
Unfortunately, the current system of patent litigation is quite slow and
inefficient. Excessive discovery costs, high fees for expert witnesses and the
temporal and monetary costs of "educating" judges and juries in scientific
principles and patent law all contribute to shortcomings of civil patent
litigation.
This Note will first examine various problems with the current system
of litigation in the context of patent disputes. It will next explore alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) as a means to address some of the shortcomings of
litigation. Finally, this Note will propose and examine the desirability of a
system of mandatory ADR for patent disputes.
II. BACKGROUND
The power of Congress to award patents to inventors for their new
inventions is provided in the Constitution. 1 Congress first authorized the
issuance of patents for certain inventions in the Patent Act of 1790.2 Since
1 "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 Act of Apr, 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
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the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) was established in 1836, 3 over five
million patents have been awarded to various inventors. 4 Utility patents are
awarded to inventors for their innovations that meet the three basic statutory
requirements of novelty, utility and nonobviousness. 5 Once granted, a
patent affords its holder a series of powerful rights, including the right to
exclude others from making, using or selling the claimed invention. 6 A
copy of the patent, which includes the patentee's enabling description of the
invention, is kept by the PTO and is available to the public to read and
inspect. 7 After the term of the patent expires, anyone in the United States is
free to make or use the technology. Thus, our patent system effectively
offers inventors a monopoly, for a limited time, 8 in exchange for full
disclosure of the invention. 9
Patent law is quite a fertile field for litigation.10 The most common
form of patent litigation is an action in patent infringement, wherein the
patent holder alleges that a second party has infringed upon one or more of
the claims of the patent.11 Other common inter partes patent issues include
disputes as to licensing agreements, challenges to the validity of the patent
and interference proceedings. 12
3 See FLOYD D. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 19 (1956).
4 See In re Fressola, 22 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1828, 1830 (1992).
5 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
7 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-113 (1988) (requiring the applicant to submit a written
description and drawing, as necessary, of the invention specific enough to allow a person
skilled in the area to make and use the invention). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union
Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400, 403 (D. Del. 1931) (noting that the inventor "pays" for the
patent by fully disclosing the invention in such a way to allow others to make or use it).
8 Recent General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) legislation has changed the
patent term to twenty years from the date of application. See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, U.S. GA7T
Legislation Changes Patent Terr, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 222 (1995).
9 The rights enjoyed by a patentee are the reward offered to the inventor in exchange for
the benefits the public receives after the patent expires. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 401-402 (1911).
10 See PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 17.00, at 17-3 to 17-4
(2d ed. 1980).
11 Infringement is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988). "[W]hoever without authority
makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the
patent therefor infringes the patent." Id.
12 Interference proceedings are held within the PTO to determine which of two or more
parties is the inventor of the claimed invention. It is termed an interference proceeding
because the hearing takes place whenever the Commissioner of Patents has reason to believe
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III. INEFFICIENCIES AND COMPLICATIONS
IN PATENT LITIGATION
Most patent disputes are resolved through the standard civil litigation
action. The complainant files suit, usually in federal court, 13 and the case is
placed on the docket and ultimately resolved. There are, however, many
problems with the current system that render it unsatisfactory in several
respects. Although some of the problems are inherent in our judicial system
and pervade all litigation actions, many of the problems are more
pronounced in the area of patent litigation. Of course, no system of
resolving disputes can be completely free of imperfections, and the ultimate
appraisal lies in comparing one system's benefits and drawbacks with the
available alternatives. In several of the problems detailed below, however,
the shortcomings of patent litigation may be alleviated or eliminated
through the use of ADR.
A. Lost Opportunities
A major problem with patent litigation arises from the high cost of lost
opportunities. Patents possess value largely because they represent advances
over the current, existing state of technology. The cost of lost opportunities
due to time spent in litigation to determine the status of a patent, or to
clarify terms in a patent-related contract, may diminish, or even completely
dissipate, the value of the patent.14 It has been noted that "[w]hat is today's
innovation is tomorrow's obsolete product." 15 Thus, prompt resolution of
patent disputes is very important to the patent owner. 16 Although patent
holders may continue to market their patents during the pendency of patent
disputes, the uncertainty of the outcome of the lawsuits often discourages
an application "interferes" with another pending application or unexpired patent. See 35
U.S.C. § 135 (1988).
13 Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement cases. See
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
14 See William F. Heinze, Patent Mediation: The Forgotten Alternative in Dispute
Resolution, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 333, 344 (1991) (discussing the high costs of lost opportunities).
15 Roger S. Borovoy, Alternative Means of Resolving High Technology Disputes, in
PATENT ANTITRUST 1989, at 539, 542 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 270) [hereinafter PLI/Pat].
16 See Karl P. Kilb, Note, Arbitration of Patent Disputes: An Important Option in the
Age ofInformation Technology, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599, 611
(1993) (discussing the need for quick resolution of patent disputes in the computer industry).
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parties from further developing and marketing their inventions.17 The
litigation process thus delays many new ideas from reaching the
marketplace.
New technological advances now arise at an ever-increasing rate, and
the time frame for which each new invention has significant utility or value
is steadily shrinking. Further, the advent of the "information highway" and
other electronic communication and informational services will continue to
increase the potential for patent disputes, 18 placing more and more scientific
advances in the hands of the courts. It is poor policy to allow these
advances, embodied in the form of patents, to be fettered in the courtroom,
instead of freeing the new technology to be put to productive uses.
B. Costs
Another problem with the current litigation system arises because patent
litigation is particularly costly.' 9 Fees for discovery, experts, court costs
and attorney fees can put an immense financial strain on parties to a patent
litigation action. When signing a bill into law that authorized enforceable
arbitration of patent disputes, 20 President Reagan specifically noted the
"inordinately high cost of patent litigation" as a justification for the
measures. 2 1 Although most of these litigation costs are also present in a
typical civil action, the expenses are often significantly more pronounced in
patent disputes.
The largest factor contributing to patent litigation costs is usually the
high cost of discovery. 22 Discovery can be a meticulous procedure in any
civil litigation case, but in high-technology dispute each round of discovery
usually discloses another layer of problems that must be explored. 23 Thus,
discovery becomes a painstaking process, much like peeling an onion, 24 and
may take years to complete. Each successive round of discovery, of course,
further escalates costs.
17 See Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the
Use of Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 251-252
(1995).
18 See Kilb, supra note 16, at 611.
19 See Paradise, supra note 17, at 253.
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988). For further discussion of this legislation, see infra Part
IV.A.
21 Statement on Signing the Patent and Trademark Office Appropriations Bill, II PUB.
PAPERS 1087 (Aug. 28, 1982).
22 See Paradise, supra note 17, at 253.
23 See Borovoy, supra note 15, at 541.
24 See id.
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Another factor contributing to the high expense of patent cases is their
heavy reliance upon expert testimony. Both parties normally require experts
to bolster their case, and the outcome of the dispute often hinges upon their
testimony.25 Thus, expert witnesses must spend long hours preparing for
their testimony, and may testify at great length, both of which increases
their fees. Attorney fees may also be higher in patent cases because the
attorneys may spend significant amounts of time learning the technical
subject matter underlying the patent. The attorney must first invest time to
understand the underlying scientific principles before he or she can
effectively argue the case on its merits, 26 and this time is of course billed to
the client.
C. Unfair Advantages
Delays in patent litigation may place disparate burdens on the parties
due to differing impacts of the uncertainties of the litigation. For example,
litigation involving the validity of the patent may provide an incentive for
the patent holder to delay the litigation. Although deferrals and
postponements may hurt the nonpatent holder due to the economic harm of
lost opportunities, 27 the patent holder does not experience a corresponding
harm. Similarly, in cases in which the patent holder sues an alleged
infringer, the uncertainty of the litigation may prevent the alleged infringer
from further developing, manufacturing or marketing the product, and this
"lost time" imposes a hardship upon that party. One party may thereby
impose economic losses on its opponent through use of tactical stalling
techniques.. The possibility for parties to benefit from intentional delay is
both unfair and inefficient. 28 This is especially problematic because many
products and methods possess only a limited window of opportunity to gain
entry into the marketplace.
25 See Paradise, supra note 17, at 275.
26 The attorney must, in turn, educate the judge and jury as to the underlying scientific
principles. This extra time in the courtroom further escalates costs and contributes to other
problems discussed further in this Note.
27 The nonpatent holder may continue to market the product during the course of
litigation, but the uncertainty surrounding the legality or profitability of doing so may
effectively prevent this. See Paradise supra note 17 and accompanying text.
28 But see Borovoy, supra note 15, at 542 for discussion that it may be in the interest of
the defendant to avoid delays because the plaintiff may accept less from the defendant in
exchange for a speedier resolution.
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D. Prolonged Proceedings
The current patent litigation system is also problematic in the length of
time required to resolve cases that go to trial. 29 Longer delays increase
costs, 30 but protracted litigation can also cause other, distinct problems.
Delays and lengthy trials cause frustration and reduce the public's
confidence in the court system. Time lapses also contribute to lost and
unavailable evidence, thus increasing the risk of error at trial. 3 1 Delays can
also further aggravate the high cost of lost opportunities. Finally, it is a
goal of the federal court system to provide for speedy resolution of
disputes. 32
The primary factor contributing to lengthy patent trials, even more so
than regular trials, is the significant amount of time afforded to discovery.
Discovery in patent cases is usually detailed and meticulous, and thus very
time-consuming. 33 Additional time delays, although fairly minor when
compared to the prolonged periods of discovery, may also occur in the
courtroom. Once at trial, attorneys often have to invest time in educating
judges and juries as to either the technical background of the subject matter
or a basic background of patent law.
Our justice system strives to provide speedy resolution of disputes, but
timeliness has been a particular problem with patent cases. The average time
to resolve a patent infringement suit, from filing to final appellate
determination, is over one-third of the former seventeen-year life of a
patent. 34
29 In 1968, 1969 and 1970, while more than 90% of civil cases were resolved within
three full days of trial, while less than 50% of patent cases were resolved in the same amount
of time. See Kilb, supra note 16, at 602. Note, however, that most patent cases, like other
disputes, settle prior to trial.
30 As noted in Part 1II.B.
31 See Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding
Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REv.
189, 206 (1995).
32 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be "construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIv. P. 1. See also
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) (stating that these principles are
the "touchstones of federal procedure").
33 See Borovoy, supra note 15, at 541.
34 See Tom Arnold, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Cases, in
PATENT LITIGATION 1992, at 667, 672 (PLI/Pat Series No. G-350). The term of a patent has
since been extended from seventeen years from date of issue to twenty years from date of
filing of the application. Sed supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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E. Complexity of Patent Law and Scientific Principles: Uneducated
Verdicts
An additional problem with the current system arises from the complex
technology that often underlies the basic dispute in patent cases. The fact-
finder often has difficulty understanding the basic technology behind the
dispute, which can result in unfair outcomes. For example, a defendant in a
patent litigation suit may utilize a manufacturing process that produces
exactly the same end result as the plaintiff's patented process. However, if
the end result of the defendant's process is accomplished in a different
manner from that of the plaintiff, there is no patent infringement. 35
Difficulties may arise because the differences between the two, processes
will often entail fine distinctions that invoke complex principles of science
or engineering. It may be challenging for even a highly skilled attorney to
explain these differences to the fact-finder. Even if the distinction is well
explained, it may be unreasonable to expect the judge or jury to
comprehend the science behind the technical explanation. 36
Thus, underinformed, or even flatly uninformed, verdicts may be
rendered at trial.3 7 Decisions based upon inappropriate or irrelevant
grounds, or perhaps upon nothing more than mere guessing, may decide
these highly consequential lawsuits. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court noted
that "patent litigation can present issues so complex that legal minds,
without appropriate grounding in science and technology, may have
difficulty in reaching decision [sic]." 38
Besides the complexity of the information, the sheer volume of factual
information presented at trial burdens the judge and jury even further.
Patent trials are often lengthy to begin with, and evidence tends to multiply
35 "A patented process is infringed only by the unauthorized performance of
substantially the same process steps in substantially the same way to accomplish substantially
the same result." Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 1981)
(citing Int'l Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 400), af'd, 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
36 Judge Friendly once noted, "This patent appeal is another illustration of the absurdity
of requiring the decision of such cases to be made by judges whose knowledge of the relevant
technology derives primarily, or even solely, from explanations by counsel . . . ." General
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem. Co., Inc., 497 F.2d 1283, 1284 (2d Cir. 1974), cen.
denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974).
37 See Paradise, supra note 17, at 254 (questioning the overall quality and fairness of
court judgments in patent litigation cases).
38 Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 (1971).
Further, the important task of claim interpretation is exclusively in the hands of the court. See
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
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exponentially as the number of issues increases. 39 Thus, in order to
appropriately analyze the dispute, the fact-finder is expected to not only
retain the extensive amounts of factual information presented, but to also
accurately apply the newly learned scientific principles to those facts. This,
clearly, is a demanding and somewhat unrealistic expectation. 40
Furthermore, the area of patent law itself is unique and unlike other
traditional areas of law. It can be difficult to master, even for those trained
in law. Decisions in several patent cases reveal that some judges, too, can
have an underlying ignorance of patent law. 41
Somewhat abating the problem of uneducated verdicts is the fact that
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1295, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from district courts in cases
relating to patents. The CAFC has thereby accumulated a great deal of
experience in patent cases and has displayed a solid technical grasp of many
issues. Nevertheless, it is inefficient to rely upon an appellate body to
correct oversights and errors in the lower courts. Furthermore, the CAFC
does not have the time or resources to micromanage district courts, and it
would presumably prefer to guide policy rather than review for errors.
Finally, parties do not always have the resources available to appeal to the
CAFC.
F. Overcrowded Dockets
Another problem with the current system, perhaps a symptom of all of
the other problems, is the congested dockets of the court system. The
overloaded system slows the resolution time for patent disputes, and the
lengthy nature of patent litigation further burdens the system. The federal
courts are already crowded, 42 and the number of intellectual property
39 Cf. David W. Plant, Arbitration of Patent Cases, in PATENT LITIGATION 1986. at
137, 144 (PLI/Pat Series No. 233).
40 See Seymour E. Hollander, Patent Counsel Debate Pros and Cons of ADR, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at C20 (noting that the issue of infringement of a patent may be beyond
the grasp of any juror in complex cases).
41 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 674-675 (discussing misunderstandings and
contradictions by judges at both the trial and appellate levels).
42 See David W. Plant, ADR and Patents, in PATENT LITIGATION 1992, at 797, 800
(PLI/Pat Series no. G-350). But see J. Stratton Shartel, Legislation Authorizing Mandatory
Arbitration Should Be Scrapped, 8 No. 8 INSIDE LITIO. 2, Sept. 1994 (discussing Federal
Court Management Statistics reporting that the number of cases tried in federal trial courts has
been cut by one-third since the 1970s).
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actions filed is rapidly increasing. 43 Thus, a method of dispute resolution
that could ease the load on the court system and lead to quicker resolution
of disputes would be a welcome improvement. A system for resolving
patent disputes that helps to reduce costs, is more efficient, helps to ensure
well-educated verdicts and eases the workload on the federal courts is
unquestionably preferable to the current system. 44 Incorporating ADR
processes into the current litigation system may help provide several of
these desired results with few or no adverse effects.
IV. BENEFITS ADR CAN BRING TO PATENT DISPUTES
A. Federal Initiatives
Historically, courts have looked unfavorably upon the use of ADR to
resolve questions of patent validity and infringement.4 5 The reasoning of the
tribunals was that these issues raise strong public policy concerns, and thus
resolution of these issues should remain in the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal court system.46
However, the federal-level reluctance to endorse ADR for patents has
changed in recent years. In 1982, Congress amended the Patent Act, adding
Section 294, which ensured that agreements to submit patent disputes to
arbitration are enforceable in court.47 Thus, disputes as to patent validity,
infringement and enforceability may now be submitted to binding
arbitration. The House Committee on the Judiciary reported favorably upon
the use of arbitration, noting:
43 From 1972 to 1987, the number of intellectual property actions among the 1,000
largest corporations nearly doubled. See Plant, supra note 42, at 800.
44 It has been recognized that a strong need exists for "procedures alternative to
litigation which can resolve patent disputes." Kevin R. Casey, Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Parent Law, 3 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 1, 1 (1993).
45 See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th
Cir. 1970), cen. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 440 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374
.U.S. 174, 199-200 (1963) (White, J., concurring).
46 In Beckman, the court adopted the district court's reasoning in noting:
The complex principles of patent law which a court must consider and apply when
deciding issues of validity and infringement, affect important questions of public policy
and public rights. In considering the validity of patent claims, a court makes decisions
crucial not only to the parties involved, but of vital importance to the public generally.
433 F.2d at 63.
47 See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988).
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The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and
faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary
rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing
and future business dealings among the parties; it is often more
flexible in regard to scheduling.., and, arbitrators are frequently
better versed than judges and juries in the area of trade customs and
the technologies involved in these disputes. 48
This legislation represents a federal policy favoring voluntary
resolution of patent disputes by the parties themselves. 49 Furthermore,
Congress has also passed legislation that allows for the arbitration of in
patent interferences. 50 The statute serves to broaden what constitutes an
interference and simultaneously encouraged the use of arbitration to settle
interference disputes. 5 1
Further, in May, 1996 Executive Order 12988 on Civil Justice Reform
became effective. That order enumerates guidelines that encourage federal
agency litigation counsel to consider the possibility of using ADR in civil
actions against the agency. 52 Indeed, one area in which ADR may be
utilized is in civil actions against the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. 53 The judicial branch has also expressed its approval for ADR
techniques. The United States Supreme Court recently endorsed general
arbitration for Security Exchange Act and RICO54 claims against
stockholders, and claims under the Sherman Act in international
commerce. 55 Several other decisions by the Court have demonstrated
approval of ADR techniques in a variety of other settings. 56 Thus, recent
48 H.R. REP. No. 97-542, 97th at 12 (1982).
49 See Sol L. Goldstein, Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Patent Validity or
Infringement, 72 ILL. B.J. 350, 351 (1984).
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 135(d) (1994).
51 See Kilb, supra note 16, at 605-606.
52 See Charles E. Miller et al., Executive Order Allows PTO Action Arbitration, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at C18.
53 See id.
54 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1994).
55 See Robert D. Raven, Alternative Dispute Resohaion: Expanding Opportunities, in
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR ATTORNEYS AND THEIR CUENTS 11-62, 11-
63 (Charles A. Cooper et al. eds., 1991).
56 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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federal mandates demonstrate an approval of ADR in general and also
specifically support the application of ADR to patent disputes.
B. ADR Overview
ADR techniques vary widely and are not subject to any uniform
definitions.5 7 In fact, ADR processes are often designed without a firm
definition and remain malleable so that the participants may mold the
procedures to their own liking. 58 Nevertheless, this section briefly describes
some common characteristics of the two forms of ADR that are analyzed in
this Note: arbitration and mediation.
1. Arbitration
Arbitration is a process that usually involves the presentation of the
dispute to a fact-finder, who then renders a decision, opinion or award. The
arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, reviews to the evidence and oversees the
proceedings, and in this sense is similar to a judge. Both parties usually
retain counsel to present their cases through both documents and argument.
Discovery is typically quite limited in arbitration proceedings, 59 and
rules of evidence usually do not apply unless the parties agree otherwise. 6
0
Evidence is received during the hearing and its credibility weighed by the
arbitrator. 61
Arbitration is further subdivided into the categories of binding and
nonbinding. 62 In nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator renders a decision
that neither party is compelled to follow. The arbitrator furnishes the
decision to communicate his perspective on the various claims, and to
thereby instigate further settlement talks between the parties. 63 In contrast,
when binding arbitration is utilized, the arbitrator renders a definitive award
that is enforceable in court. A written opinion is often issued to supplement
or explain the award. When "arbitration" is used, most intend the term to
57 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 711.
58 See Donald A. Rowe, Issues re ADR Procedures, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION GUIDE 19 (American Intellectual Property Law Association Alternative Dispute
Resolution Committee ed., 1995).
59 See id. at 20.
6 0 See id. at 21.
61 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 728.
6 2 See David W. Plant, Overview of ADR Procedures, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION GUIDE, supra note 58, at 3.
63 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 726-727.
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connote "binding arbitration." Unless otherwise specified, this Note will
follow the same convention.
2. Mediation
"Mediation" also encompasses a wide range of ADR techniques. At its
core, however, mediation entails a procedure for facilitating voluntary
settlement, wherein no adjudications or decisions are imposed. 64 Instead,
the mediator communicates directly with the parties or their counsel and
may even allow the parties to talk directly to each other. The mediator may
also caucus privately with each party to cultivate open lines of
communication. 65
The mediator does not pass judgment on the parties' respective claims,
but instead strives to bring the parties to a better understanding of where
their points of agreement and difference lie. 66 The mediator may then use
this information to help bring the parties to a common ground. Mediation is
purely voluntary, and the mediator cannot bind the parties to any particular
result. 67 The process requires compromise and cooperation, and therefore,
the mediator's skill is crucial to the success of the mediation. 68
There are a variety of options for parties who wish to utilize ADR to
commence ADR proceedings. Parties that have previous dealings may agree
to submit their disputes to arbitration, mediation or one of the many other
forms of ADR (including neutral evaluation, summary jury trials,
minitrials, final-offer arbitration or various hybrids of these techniques).
As noted earlier, binding arbitration agreements involving patents are
now enforceable by the courts. 69 When settlements are reached through
mediated agreements, enforcement of the agreements is governed primarily
by contract law. 70 Many patent disputes, however, arise between parties that
have not had any previous dealings. In these cases, in order to use ADR,
64 See Plant, supra note 62, at 5.
65 See id.
66 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE
8 (1989).
67 See Id. at 1.
68 See Plant, supra note 62, at 5.
69 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988).
7 0 See NANCY N. ROGERs & R. SALEM, A STUDENT's GUIDE To MEDIATION AND THE
LAW 156 (1987) (citing Robert P. Burns, The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements: An
Essay on Legitimation and Process Integrity, 2 OHIO ST. 1. ON DISP. RESOL. 93 (1986)).
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the parties must agree to submit their dispute to ADR after the dispute has
arisen. 7 1
Another manner in which to enter ADR proceedings is under "court-
annexed" or "judicial" arbitration or mediation. Courts will not usually
mandate arbitration without the parties' consent, so mandatory mediation is
the more common of the two. However, when mandatory arbitration is in
fact directed, once the parties participate in the arbitration proceedings, the
decision may become binding if neither party makes a timely request for a
trial de novo. 72 Conversely, if the court so wishes, the award given by the
arbitrator may be completely nonbinding and given solely to facilitate
settlement talks. 73
C. Arbitration of Patent Disputes
Arbitration offers many advantages over the current system of patent
litigation. One major advantage of arbitration over patent litigation is
attributed to the fact that the parties may select an arbitrator who is
experienced and knowledgeable in the area of patent law. It is, in fact,
strongly recommended that the chosen arbitrator be familiar with the body
of patent law. 74 Furthermore, if the patent at issue involves a complicated
area of technology, the parties may also select an arbitrator with technical
expertise in that particular field.
Having an arbitrator who is familiar with patent law, or, if necessary,
the underlying technology, to rule on the case will help to eliminate many
of the problems highlighted above. The use of expert testimony may be
significantly decreased. Less time will be spent in the courtroom
"educating" the fact-finder, 75 and arbitration can be structured by the
parties to proceed much faster than litigation. One commentator noted that
the time frame for patent arbitration is often as little as six months, and it
need never take more than twelve to fifteen months.76 The same
commentator further notes that if the arbitration is handled with skill and
71 It should be noted that it is generally more difficult to get parties to agree to submit
their claims to ADR after, as opposed to before, the triggering event has occurred. See Plant,
supra note 39, at 140.
72 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 737-738.
73 See id. at 726-728.
74 See Borovoy, supra note 15, at 545; See also Goldstein, supra note 49, at 352.
75 See Rowe, supra note 58, at 25.
76 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 679. However, it has been noted that procedural
formalities and a reluctance of arbitrators to sanction parties in order to control their attorneys
may make some arbitrations as time consuming as litigation. See Heinze, supra note 14, at
342.
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experience, he can "almost guarantee" that arbitration costs should be less
than fifty percent of the litigation costs of a patent infringement suit.77
Furthermore, the use of an individual with technical expertise as an
arbitrator should serve to virtually eliminate any problems arising from
uneducated verdicts.
The streamlined discovery procedures utilized in arbitration can result
in significant time and cost savings. 78 The problems of protracted litigation
leaving a patent out-dated and diminished in value, will, in turn, also be
diminished. Furthermore, although the incentive for parties to delay the
proceedings will still be present, their ability to do so will be severely
undermined.
A common criticism of arbitration is that the arbitrators are often
perceived as rendering "compromise verdicts" in which they simply split
the difference between both parties' demands. 79 When this happens, both
parties may walk away unsatisfied.80 However, this may be an unfair
criticism as it has been noted that both judges and juries also regularly
render compromise verdicts.81 Nevertheless, this issue remains a common
complaint among parties to arbitration.
Another criticism of arbitration is that it may not solve the underlying
dispute between the parties.82 If there is a more fundamental disagreement
or source of animosity between the parties, arbitration will usually only
resolve the current, surface dispute without mending the deeper conflict.
However, the same shortcoming is also present in patent litigation.
Furthermore, because the proceedings in arbitration are less adversarial,83
77 See id. Another writer noted that the cost of arbitration may be as low as 10% of the
cost of traditional litigation. See Thomas L. Creel, Factors in Deciding Whether to Use ADR
in Patent Disputes, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION GUIDE, supra note 58, at 33.
78 See Kenneth B. Clark & William A. Fenwick, Structuring An Arbitration Agreement
for High Technology Disputes, 9 No. 9 COMPUTER LAw. 22, 23 (1992). However, it has also
been noted that streamlined discovery may also undercut the quality of fact-finding. See
Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 878 (1994). Furthermore, many attorneys and clients may avoid
arbitration because of the lack of conformity to the rules of evidence. See Paradise, supra note
17, at 269-273.
79 See Heinze, supra note 14, at 339.
80 See id.
81 See CPR TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
TECHNOLOGY DISPUTES 8 (1993) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY DISPUTES]; See also Arnold,
supra note 34, at 685.
82 See Heinze, supra note 14, at 343.
83 See Paradise, supra note 17, at 264; See also Heinze, supra note 14, at 346. But see
Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 270, 276 (1982)
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and are carried out on a smaller scale than full-blown litigation, arbitration
will be more successful than litigation at maintaining relationships between
disputants. 84
Traditionally, parties have avoided arbitration when the dispute
involves the potential for very high gains or losses. 85 The predictability
provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and stare decisis may be reasons to turn to the courts for high-
stake disputes. Furthermore, when clients are faced with large gains or
losses, they tend to feel more secure if they have invested large amounts of
resources into bolstering their position. Because of the large monetary
values that patents may possess, it is often difficult to persuade clients to
submit a high-stakes patent dispute to arbitration. 86 It has been noted that to
do so may be considered by the client to be "penny-wise and pound-
foolish." 87
However, it should be noted that whatever resources one side invests in
litigation, the other is sure to attempt to match. This is not to say parties
should not invest significant resources into strengthening their position, but
doing so does not always help put a party in a better position than it would
have been in without investing the resources. This is especially true when
both sides have nearly equal resources. In order for arbitration to be used in
patent disputes, clients should be counseled that they need not fear the
process simply because it costs less. They should be instructed that
arbitration still seeks a fair and just result, and that simply because it costs
less does not mean it is "poor justice." Not every case will be appropriate
for arbitration.8" However the cost savings that ADR can offer may be
substantial. In fact, it has been argued that ADR techniques offer their best
savings during high-stake disputes, because it is in these cases that clients
stand to save the most legal fees. 89 It has also been noted that ADR may
function at its best during high-stake disputes. 90
(noting that the adversarial nature of arbitration is responsible for excessive delays, high costs
and formality in arbitration proceedings).
84 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 675.
85 See Creel, supra note 77, at 32.
86 See id.
87 Hollander, supra note 40, at C20.
88 Common examples include disputes where the law is uncertain, where nonmonetary
relief is being sought, or where a party has a significant procedural advantage in litigation.
See Rowe, supra note 58, at 18.
89 See Heinze, supra note 14, at 345.
9 0 See Arnold, supra note 34, at 677.
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D. Mediation of Patent Disputes
Although arbitration of patent disputes can help to alleviate many of the
problematic aspects of patent litigation, mediation may provide an even
more attractive alternative. Mediation has many of the same characteristics
as arbitration, and thus brings many of the same advantages to the
proceedings. Streamlined discovery, less reliance upon expert testimony and
the presence of expert fact-finders help to reduce costs, save money and
produce better-educated decisions. Furthermore, the stigma of compromise
verdicts often associated with arbitration is avoided because any settlements
reached are arrived at voluntarily.
Mediation provides an additional advantage over arbitration and
litigation in that it better preserves future business relations between
parties.9 1 Because mediation is usually less adversarial than both litigation
and arbitration, it is easier to continue friendly business relations after the
process is completed. 92 Furthermore, because the nature of mediation
proceedings is nonadversarial and cooperative, the parties may work out a
solution to a long-standing problem that has been a recurring source 'of
friction and thus permanently remove the troublesome source. As a result, a
valuable client or supplier may be retained, and the parties are enabled to
successfully continue a mutually advantageous business relationship. This
reduces the transaction costs associated with developing and establishing
new business ties. 93
Often, voluntary settlement of patent disputes may be inhibited by the
technical nature of the dispute. Even if the parties want to settle, corporate
executives with the authority to settle may not understand the issues
underlying the dispute. Through participation in mediation proceedings, the
corporate executives may become more relaxed, more informed as to the
issues and more amenable to settlement. 94 Thus, mediation may provide
more settlements in high-technology disputes than would otherwise exist.
Finally, complex cases of a technical nature are particularly well-suited
to resolution by mediation. 95 ADR procedures can offer flexibility and
creativity in resolving the dispute, 96 which can be particularly helpful in
patent disputes. Patent disputes are, by nature, more susceptible to win-win
91 See Creel, supra note 77, at 32.
92 See TECHNOLOGY DISPUTES, supra note 81, at 3.
93 See Creel, supra note 77, at 35.
94 See TECHNOLOGY DISPUTES, supra note 81, at 17.
95 See id.
96 See Raven, supra note 55, at II-65.
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solutions than are, for example, general civil tort cases. 97 In particular,
licensing arrangements allow for creative solutions that may be arrived at
through mediation but would remain largely unavailable in court-imposez
decisions. 98 Also, it has been found that mediation is a highly successful
method of dispute resolution that should help increase the overall settlement
of patent disputes. 9
9
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: MANDATORY
ADR FOR PATENT DISPUTES
ADR presents several options that may help to cut costs, save time and
increase party satisfaction. However, the use of ADR needs to be increased.
There remains a lingering perception among many practicing attorneys that
ADR provides less worthwhile outcomes than litigation.100 Furthermore,
lack of education in ADR methods remains a hindrance to adequate usage.
Although ADR procedures are widely available throughout the United
States, many attorneys are not fully aware of them. 10 1 For example,
arbitration of patent disputes under 35 U.S.C. Section 294 has not been
utilized as much as expected by its drafters. 102 It has been noted that patent
disputes rarely pass through mediation or arbitration but instead usually
proceed directly to litigation. 10 3 Ideally, patent attorneys should consider
the possibility of utilizing ADR for each of their cases.
In addressing the under-utilization of ADR, it has been noted that some
corporations have adopted policies that require their management to explore
ADR options before turning to the courts. 104 This may help increase usage
of ADR, but the time and expense it would take to educate the many
corporations that remain unaware of such options can be quite high. Even
when informed as to its potential benefits, many corporations may still not
97 See Margaret E. Anderson, Intellectual Property Mediations: Special Techniques For
a Special Field, 3 Tax. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 24 (1994).
98 See Creel, supra note 77, at 35.
99 Ninety percent of mediations conducted by the American Arbitration Association
result in settlement. See Yaroslav Sochynsky, How to Approach Your Client About Mediation,
In MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR ATTORNEYS AND THEIR CUENTS, stpra
note 55, at U-11.1.
100 See Heinze, supra note 14, at 338.
10 Isee Raven, supra note 55, at 1I-62 (noting that although attorneys may have heard of
ADR, its virtues are often not well understood).
102 See Creel, supra note 77, at 31; See also Paradise, supra note 17, at 248 (stating
that most patent attorneys and their clients avoid arbitration in general).
103 See Hollander, supra note 40, at C20.
104 See id.; see also Heinze, supra note 14, at 347.
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seriously consider ADR as an option. Further, although most patent
disputes involve corporations as parties, many disputes involve
noncorporate entities that may prove even harder to reach and "educate"
than the corporations.
The potential benefits of ADR in the context of patent disputes indicate
that serious consideration should be given to initiating mandatory ADR for
patent cases. 10 5 If this initiative were adopted, it could be instituted by
requiring the parties to a patent dispute to submit their claims to an ADR
procedure before their case could be heard in court. This Note will next
explore both the possibilities of instituting mandatory arbitration or
mandatory mediation in the context of patent disputes.
A. Mandatory Arbitration
As discussed above, arbitration provides many advantages over patent
litigation. Proponents of mandatory arbitration claim that it leads to quicker
disposition of cases, 10 6 reduces out-of-pocket expenses 10 7 and adds the other
advantages of arbitration. However, several problems arise once arbitration
is made mandatory. One problem that may arise is that arbitration may
simply become another hurdle to be cleared on the way to litigation. If the
parties have the right to appeal the arbitrator's decision to the courts and are
steadfastly determined to present their case to a court of law, the arbitration
proceedings may become a mere formality that wastes both time and
resources. Furthermore, mandatory arbitration may abridge a party's right
to a trial by jury. 108 Mandatory arbitration may also constitute an unlawful
delegation of judicial power, 10 9 or a denial of due process.110 This is not to
say mandatory arbitration must be avoided, but it does appear to be
problematic in several respects.
105 A survey by the American Intellectual Property Law Association in 1995 found that
ADR was considered by patent practitioners to be "effective" fifty percent of the time. See
COMMITTEE ON ECON. LEG. PRACTICE, AMERICAN INTELL. PROP. L. AWs'N, REPORT OF
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1995, at 72.
106 See Daoud A. Awad, Note. On Behalf of Mdndatory Arbitration, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1039, 1053-1054 (1984) (examining a study comparing the speed of disposition of cases
in mandatory arbitration to litigation).
107 See id. at 1054.
108 See id. at 1045-1047.
109 Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power of the United
States in the judiciary. For a discussion of this issue, see id. at 1048-1049.
110 See id. at 1049-1050.
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B. Mandatory Mediation
For reasons discussed above, mandatory mediation may be a more
attractive option. Although participation in the program would be
mandatory, no binding result ensues. Thus, several problems associated
with mandatory arbitration, such as the denial of the right to a jury trial,
denial of due process and the potential unlawful delegation of power are all
avoided. Furthermore, costs due to the "additional hurdle" problem are also
greatly reduced. Once the mediation commences, if there is absolutely no
possibility of settlement, the mediator will be able to quickly recognize this
fact. The parties will then be free to leave mediation quickly after investing
only a minimum of resources. Mediation can also provide superior
performance over arbitration through benefits such as better-preserved
business relations and increased flexibility in fashioning a settlement.
Furthermore, the mediator may occasionally be able to bring parties
together who were convinced, prior to the mediation, that they were worlds
apart. The mediator may uncover that the parties' positions are not as
divergent as initially thought, or the mediator may come up with a
previously unconsidered, creative solution to bring the parties to an
agreement. 111
Although there will be some additional problems and costs associated
with mandatory mediation," t2 the overall benefits due to increased
settlements should pay large dividends. Utilizing a professional mediator
and forcing the parties to seriously consider settlement should increase
settlement levels." 3 This will lead to quicker resolutions and lower costs,
both of which are particular problems in the area of patent disputes. The
costs to society that arise from courtroom delays of new technology will
also be reduced. Mediation may also cause better perceptions of the court
system by parties who participate in the proceedings." 4 Indeed, aside from
the time and relatively modest costs associated with patent mediation,
I11 See Rowe, supra note 58, at 17.
112 Some problems that may arise with mandatory mediation include defining what level
of participation is required to have successfully "completed" the mediation, and how to
determine or enforce that level of participation. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 66, at
49-52 (1989). There may also be difficulties in defining what constitutes a "patent dispute":
for example, should a dispute involving a licensing agreement be classified as a patent
dispute?
113 The fact that mediation is forced does not appear to have a serious effect on the rate
of settlement. See id. at 47.
114 In at least one study, parties expressed higher levels of satisfaction with mediation
than with court proceedings. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims
Mediation in Maine: An Empiical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REv. 236, 256-257 (1981).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
"[t]here seems to be little downside risk for participation in a non-binding
procedure ..... ,5 Unfortunately, mediation "may also be the least
understood [form of ADR] by intellectual property attorneys."" 6 Thus, a
program of mandatory mediation can bring the advantages of a beneficial,
under-utilized process to the parties in a patent dispute. This can benefit our
court system and society as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Patent litigation has many characteristics that set it apart from other
standard civil litigation actions. Its complex technical characteristics lead to
greater costs, time expenditures, use of experts and potential for confusion.
Patent mediation provides an attractive alternative. Not only are there
significant time and money savings, but the parties may present their claims
to a neutral third party who will better understand the basic nature of the
dispute. Furthermore, the inherent advantages of mediation, such as helping
to preserve relations and proposing creative solutions, are also brought to
the proceedings. The advantages of mediation appear to be so beneficial that
they may warrant making mediation a mandatory process for all parties to a
patent dispute.
This is a proposal that, at the very least, deserves further consideration,
or perhaps implementation on a trial basis. Further study and
experimentation will determine whether the concept is indeed a beneficial
one. It is clear, however, that some sort of reform in the area of patent
litigation is needed, and mandatory mediation is a step in the right direction
toward the ever-present goal of improving our judicial system.
115 Rowe, supra note 58, at 19.
116 James F. McKeown, Characteristics of Neutrals and Advocates, in ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION GUIDE, supra note 58, at 44.
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